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CHINA: HYPER-DEVELOPMENT 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
DALE W EN AND M IN Q I LI
hina’s spectacular economic growth has been one o f the most dramatic
developments in the global economy over the past quarter century. 
Between 1978 and 2004 the Chinese economy expanded at an annual rate 
of 9.4 per cent. N o other large economy has ever grown so rapidly for so 
long in the economic history of the world. As a result, measured by purchas­
ing power parity, China now accounts for about 15 per cent of the world 
output, and about one-third o f the world economic growth that has taken 
place since 2000.
However, C hina’s economic growth has taken place at an enormous social 
and environmental price. A rapid increase in social and economic inequality, 
environmental degradation, m ounting rural crisis, growing urban unemploy­
m ent and poverty, pervasive government corruption, deteriorating public 
services (especially in basic education and health care), as well as escalating 
social unrest, have grown to dangerous levels and could potentially lead to an 
explosive situation.1
We focus in this essay on the environmental impact o f accumulation and 
profit-oriented development in China. Given its enormous population and 
its growing importance in the global economy, the implications of China’s 
environmental crisis go far beyond China itself. It has become an important 
and growing element in the developing global environmental crisis.
It is unlikely that either the Chinese environmental crisis, or the global 
crisis, can be effectively addressed within the existing institutional frame­
work. To build an environmentally sustainable society the economic system 
has to be fundamentally transformed so that production and consumption 
activities are oriented towards m eeting the basic needs o f the general popula­
tion rather than the pursuit of profit and wealth accumulation.
1. FROM  STATE SOCIALISM T O  CAPITALIST DEVELOPM ENT
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, China developed on a state socialist or 
Maoist model. Maoist China was by no means an ideal society. Even apart 
from the errors and excesses of M ao’s rule, economic inequalities and bureau­
cratic privileges continued to exist. The economy suffered from inefficien­
cies and imbalances. The issues of environmental sustainability were poorly 
understood. The focus on heavy industrial development led to a number of 
environmental blunders. However, these problems need to be set in their his­
torical context. Pre-revolutionary China was an oppressed, peripheral state 
with a tiny industrial platform.The new state was confronted with the hostil­
ity o f powerful foreign states and forced to respond to the pressures o f capital 
accumulation and military competition imposed by the world system.These 
circumstances greatly limited the choices available to the state. Yet despite 
these historical limitations, the experience o f Maoist China demonstrated 
that the quality of life of the working masses could be greatly improved in a 
socio-economic system based on egalitarian principles.
In the cities and industrial enterprises, the means o f production were 
mostly owned by ‘all the people’, i.e. the state. The phrase ‘iron rice bowl’ 
was used to describe the industrial employment system and its associated 
benefits. Wages were quite low. But workers enjoyed lifetime employment, 
guaranteed pension benefits, health care, housing and education for depend­
ants, paid maternity leave, and other benefits that created a high level o f social 
equity and security. In the rural areas, land and other means o f production 
were owned by collectives or communes. Despite various economic prob­
lems and low levels o f material consumption, the commune system provided 
a wide range o f social benefits, including basic public health care and educa­
tion -  the ‘five guarantees’ (food, clothes, fuel, education for the young, and 
decent burial upon death) for villagers who were unable to work and had 
no family support. So the majority o f the rural population could live with 
security and dignity.
Possibly the greatest achievement o f Maoist China was its success in meet­
ing the basic needs of the great majority of the population at very low levels 
o f per capita income and consumption. Between 1960 and 1980, the average 
life expectancy at birth o f the Chinese population rose from 36 to 67 years, 
an increase o f 31 over twenty years. By comparison, over the same period, 
the average life expectancy o f all low-income countries increased from 44 to 
53 years, an increase o f only 9. Between 1970 and 1980, the rate of illiteracy 
in China fell from 47 per cent to 33 per cent, a 29 per cent decline. Over 
the same period, the average illiteracy rate o f all low-income countries fell
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from 61 per cent to 53 per cent, down only 13 per cent. Towards the end 
o f the Maoist period, China’s performance in basic health and education 
indicators generally matched or were better than the average performance 
o f middle-income countries, despite C hina’s very low levels o f per capita 
income. By comparison, in the period o f market-oriented reform, China has 
fallen behind other low and middle income countries in the improvement of 
basic health and education indicators, despite China’s spectacular economic 
growth.2
China’s m arket-oriented reform started officially in 1979. During its first 
ten to fifteen years salient features of the reform included: breaking up ru­
ral communes, designating Special Economic Zones for foreign investment 
and free market experiments, and introducing‘market mechanisms’into state 
owned enterprises. As a result, worker benefits were reduced and the social 
safety net was steadily eroded.
In the 1990s, the Chinese leadership further embraced economic glo­
balization and liberalization. Towards the end o f the 1990s, most of the small 
and medium-sized state owned enterprises and nearly all o f the collectively 
owned enterprises were privatized. Foreign and domestic capital is now en­
couraged to take a stake in the remaining large state-owned enterprises. The 
number o f Special Economic Zones has exploded and foreign enterprises 
have further flourished, taking advantage o f China’s huge cheap labour force, 
regulatory loopholes and generous tax breaks. Hundreds o f millions o f Chi­
nese workers now work under sweatshop conditions.
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization. U nder the W T O  
accession terms China is obligated to eliminate all im port quotas and sig­
nificantly scale down its tariff protection on industrial imports. Foreign firms 
and investors have their rights greatly expanded.
W hile the Chinese leadership continues to claim that the goal o f the re­
form is to build a ‘socialist market econom y’, as far as the actual economic 
and social conditions are concerned, China has become a global corporate 
haven o f low social and environmental standards. China is now capitalist in 
all but name.3
2. CAPITAL ACCU M U LA TIO N , PR O FIT  SEEKING AND 
TH E E N V IR O N M E N T
The current economic globalization system rests upon production for profit. 
The pursuit o f profit and constant, intense pressure from market competition 
force individual entrepreneurs and corporations as well as states to pursue 
capital accumulation on an ever larger scale. The endless pursuit o f growth is 
not only a necessary outcome o f economic globalization, but is indispensable
for the survival o f the Chinese model. Despite the promise o f ‘trickle down’ 
income effects, neoliberal globalization has caused ever-rising inequality in 
income and wealth distribution within and between states in the last thirty 
years. If not alleviated by some economic growth, the tendency towards ris­
ing inequality could soon translate into absolute declines in living standards 
for the great majority o f the world’s population, producing a socially unsus­
tainable situation. In the case o f China, despite a 9.4% annual growth in the 
last twenty-plus years, relative poverty and even absolute poverty is growing 
— for example more and more people cannot afford basic services like pri­
mary health care and education, causing growing social unrest. More and 
more people are disillusioned by the empty promise that ‘the rising tide will 
lift all boats’.
Economic growth means a growing consumption o f material resources. 
Moreover, production and consumption processes generate material wastes 
that pollute the environment. Unlimited economic growth therefore tends 
to deplete natural resources and cause environmental degradation. Poten­
tially, the consequences could be so extreme that the very survival o f hu­
man civilization could be at stake. Theoretically, if technological progress 
can bring about an ever-lower environmental impact per dollar, in principle 
population and affluence can grow indefinitely. In practice, unless certain ba­
sic laws o f physics and ecology can be violated, no production or consump­
tion activities can take place w ithout using some resources and having some 
impact on the environment.There are physical limits to the reduction o f the 
environmental impact o f human activities. To the extent that environmental 
technological progress suffers from diminishing returns to scale (that is, more 
and more dollars of expenditure may be required to accomplish a given re­
duction of environmental impact), there are economic limits as well.4
Admittedly, in the Maoist era industrial development was mainly focused 
on creating a system of social equity.The links between natural resources and 
social well-being were poorly understood in many aspects. As bad as some 
industrial practices were then, at the aggregate level, the extent of resource 
depletion and environmental degradation were limited by the very low levels 
o f material consumption that prevailed.
As China shifts towards a market system and tries to integrate with the 
global economy and culture, and as the Chinese economy expands at breath­
taking pace, resource depletion and environmental degradation are all now 
occurring on a gigantic and growing scale. As China becomes the global 
centre of manufacturing exports it has simultaneously become the centre of 
resource depletion and the generation o f industrial wastes. China has become
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not only the world’s workshop but also the world’s dumping ground. Its 
natural environment is rapidly being pushed to the brink o f collapse.
In a candid interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, PanYue, 
C hina’s deputy minister of Environmental Protection Administration, ad­
dressed the environmental crises:‘O ur raw materials are scarce, we don’t have 
enough land, and our population is constantly growing. ...C ities are grow­
ing, but desert areas are expanding at the same time; habitable and usable land 
has been halved over the past 50 years. ...[C hina’s GDP miracle] will end 
soon because the environment can no longer keep pace’.b
The situation is dire, and not only for China. Climate change, water pol­
lution and shortages, acid rain, wildlife extinction, and many other environ­
mental factors affect the sustainability o f the entire planet.
3. A G RICU LTU RA L PRIVATIZATION AND 
EN V IRO N M EN TA L DEGRADA TION
Agriculture is the economic sector that arguably has the most intimate rela­
tions with the environment. Before 1979, most Chinese farmers were or­
ganized into collective communes. China’s market-oriented reform began 
with de facto privatization of agricultural production. The first step was the 
implementation o f the family contract system. This system broke up the 
communes and gave contracts o f land to individual families. Initially, agricul­
tural output and rural incomes increased significantly. But economic growth 
in the rural areas slowed down considerably in the mid 1980s. By the late 
1980s and early 1990s, most rural areas entered a state o f stagnation or even 
degeneration. Today, China’s rural areas face an unprecedented social and 
environmental crisis.
Since 1979, Chinese agriculture has been transformed through the mas­
sive use o f chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and hybrid seeds, made possible 
by the industrial and technological build-up in the pre-reform era. Initially, 
chemical-based agriculture worked wonders, helped by the water works and 
irrigation systems built in the commune era. Fertilizer usage more than dou­
bled between 1978 and 1984, helping farmers to achieve record harvests.
Another factor that contributed to the short-term  increase in household 
income was the exploitation o f communal assets. For example, immediately 
following the implementation o f the family contract system, there was no 
control over the rampant cutting of trees, which had been planted by the 
communes over the previous 30 years as roadside windbreaks to prevent 
erosion. Between 1985 and 1989, there was a 48 per cent decline in the area 
covered by windbreaks nationwide.6
The official media attribute the rural boom in the early reform years 
(1978-1984) to the de-collectivization process. In fact, more than two-thirds 
of the gains in that period were achieved before 1982, when the large-scale 
de-collectivization started. O ther factors, such as rising grain prices and the 
use o f chemical fertilizers, contributed much more to the short-lived success. 
The same technical factors contributed to the stagnation which followed. 
After the state price control on agricultural inputs was lifted in the mid- 
1980s, prices skyrocketed. W ithin two years, fertilizer prices rose 43 per cent 
and pesticide prices rose 82.3 per cent, and these prices continued to rise by 
more than 10 per cent annually throughout the 1990s. But by now, farmers 
were trapped in a vicious circle, compelled to pump more chemicals onto 
the fields to keep up yields as the organic matter in the soil declined.
The de facto privatization o f agriculture has had profound long-term  envi­
ronmental and economic effects. Given the high population density, Chinese 
family farms are often less than one hectare, or even half a hectare. This rules 
out any possibility o f economies o f scale. Many technological inputs like 
tractors or grain-thrashing machines are too expensive for individual fami­
lies. As a result many villages experienced de-mechanization in the initial 
years o f privatization. As farmers put more labour into tasks previously done 
by machines, they have to cut back on other types of work, including good 
environmental practices like the application o f organic and green manure.
Compared to the communes, family farms are much more vulnerable 
to natural disasters and market fluctuations, which put pressure on farmers 
to overtax the environment. The small size o f the farms makes integrated 
environmental management difficult. As one farmer observed: ‘W hen I ap­
ply pesticide, the pests simply migrate to my neighbour’s field; the next day 
when he applies pesticide, all the pests come back to my plot. We end up 
wasting lots o f chemicals while achieving very little’. In many villages, even 
the tiny family farms are spatially fragmented. The villagers demanded that 
land distribution should be fair and equal. Consequently, one family might 
end up with some high-grade plots on one end o f the village, some low- 
grade plots on the other end, and some medium-grade plots somewhere else, 
posing further difficulties for integrated management. Some villages attempt 
a different scheme: each family is allocated one chunk o f land, and the plots 
are rotated over the years. But this creates another problem: farmers lose in­
centives to invest in land and soil for long-term  gain.7
Figure 1 presents C hina’s total grain production and per capita grains 
production between 1978 and 2003.Total production rose steadily through­
out the 1980s and much o f the 1990s. However, between 1998 and 2003 
grain production fell sharply. Although the total production has recovered
CHINA: HYPER-DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 135

deaths caused by air pollution in developing countries, at more than twice 
the rate of South Asia, which has a comparable population. Acid rain impacts 
about one-third o f the country.10
W hile a transition from coal to oil or natural oil has reduced urban air pol­
lution, a large-scale transition from bicycles and mass transit toward private 
automobiles in recent years has offset all the benefits and further exacerbated 
the problem. While many multinational car companies have taken this as an 
opportunity to sell ‘clean vehicle technology’ to China, the whole premise 
o f automobile-oriented growth and urban planning needs to be called into 
question. The majority o f urban residents still rely on bicycles and public 
transport and have to suffer from the filthy air and increasing traffic jams 
brought about by the explosion o f vehicles. For example, the average bus 
speed in Beijing was 10 miles per hour in the 1980s. It decreased to 5 miles 
per hour in the 1990s, and today has fallen to a crawling 2.5 miles per hour. 
In 2004, China became the world’s fourth largest producer and third largest 
consumer of automobiles. The number o f automobiles in China is growing 
at 19 per cent per year. Cleaner technology cannot deliver cleaner air if this 
trend is not abated.
Water scarcity and water pollution
China is facing one o f the world’s worst water shortages. The country is 
divided into two regions: the ‘dry N o rth ’, referring to all areas north of 
the Yangtze basin, and the ‘humid South’, which includes the Yangtze River 
basin and everything south o f it. The north has a population o f 550 million, 
two-thirds o f the country’s cropland, and one-fifth o f the water. The South 
has a population o f 700 million, one-third o f the cropland, and four-fifths of 
the water.
The water shortage is most serious in the Yellow River basin in N orthern  
China, which is generally considered the birthplace of Chinese culture. The 
river flows though the Loess Plateau, where the planet’s most extensive soil 
erosion is to be found. After several thousand years o f continuous cultivation 
much of the natural vegetation has been stripped away. This is compounded 
by the fact that the soil on the Loess Plateau is noted as being among the 
most erosion-prone on the planet.The river is laden with yellow sediments, 
which give it its name.
In the last several decades the deteriorating ability of local vegetation to 
conserve water, and the over-pumping o f ground water, have shrunk the riv­
er’s water supply. In 1972, for the first time, the river failed to reach the sea. In 
1997, a year o f severe drought, the river failed to reach its last 700 kilometres 
for 226 days; for its last 136-kilometer stretch the dry period was 330 days.
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The dry runs have severely affected the normal life and production of people 
along the river’s middle and lower reaches and led to a further deterioration 
in the local ecology.There is fierce and bitter competition for water between 
the mainly agricultural upstream provinces and more industrialized coastal 
provinces.
Due to water shortages and the widespread pollution of surface water, 
more cities and villages are increasingly tapping into underground aquifers. 
U nder the N orth  China Plain, a region that produces 40 per cent of China’s 
grain, the water table is dropping by an average of 1.5 metres per year. In 
1999, the water table under the capital city Beijing dropped by 2.5 metres. 
Since 1965, the water table under the city has fallen by some 59 meters.W hat 
will people do when the aquifers are depleted?11
About 60 per cent of the water in seven major river systems -  the Yangtze, 
Yellow, Huai, Songhua, Hai, Liao, and Pearl Rivers — are classified as grade IV 
or worse — meaning, not suitable for human contact. 75 per cent o f the lakes 
suffer from various degrees o f eutrophication.The culprits are often agricul­
tural runoff and untreated wastewater from both municipalities and industry. 
Chinese farmers use 2.3 times as much chemicals (fertilizers and pesticides) 
as US farmers. About one-third o f industrial wastewater and two-thirds of 
municipal wastewater is released into waterways w ithout any treatment.12
In 1994 the government began a massive clean-up campaign for the Huai 
River, one o f the most polluted in China. After billions o f dollars have been 
poured into the clean-up effort, improvement of the water quality remains 
an illusion. China’s State Environmental Protection Administration has so lit­
tle authority that the fines they levy are often less than the cost of using water 
treatment equipment where it has been installed, so naturally many manufac­
turers choose to pay fines instead. According to government estimates, while 
water treatment facilities have been installed in most major industrial plants 
under government mandate, one-third o f these are not being operated at all 
and another one-third are being operated only occasionally.13
Pollution is exacerbating the water scarcity problem. In the previously wa­
ter-rich Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta regions water shortages 
have emerged in recent years, and much water has been rendered unusable 
due to heavy pollution. Contamination is spreading to underground aquifers 
as well — it is estimated that 25 per cent o f aquifers are being polluted.
Land degradation and soil pollution
According to the m onitoring results o f China’s State Forestry Administration 
in 1999, China has 2.67 million square kilometres o f desert land, account­
ing for 27.9 per cent o f its total territory; and this area is still expanding at
construction use, the responsible party has the financial obligation to create 
the same amount o f arable land somewhere else. W hile this act has slowed
more marginal lands are reclaimed for cultivation while fertile farmlands are
tion) and that pollution is responsible for more than 10 million tons o f re-
The Yangtze River and Pearl River Deltas, two prosperous regions thanks 
to recent rapid export-oriented growth, serve as examples. For centuries, the 
fertile and water rich river deltas were China’s rice and fish baskets.They still 
supply the country with a considerable amount o f agricultural products. But 
probably unknown to most consumers, or even the growers themselves, the 
farmland in these regions is suffering from extensive contamination from
industries outsourced from the advanced capitalist countries, or even from
The Yangtze River Delta exhibits a similar situation. Scientists have found 
16 kinds of PAHs and more than 100 kinds o f PCBs, both highly carcino-
ture University, more than 70 per cent of the soil samples were found to have
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above-normal levels of heavy metal. Highly contaminated grains including 
‘mercury rice’, ‘lead rice’, and ‘cadmium rice’ have been found in the mar­
ket.18
5. CHINA, TH E GLOBAL EN E R G Y  CRISIS 
‘ AND CLIMATE CHANGE
According to the International Energy Agency, China accounted for 7.2 per 
cent o f the world’s total primary energy consumption in 1973 and 13.5 
per cent in 2003. Between 1973 and 2003, the world energy consumption 
expanded at an average annual rate of 1.9 per cent and China’s energy con­
sumption expanded at an average annual rate o f 4.0 per cent.19 If C hina’s 
energy consumption keeps growing at this rate it will double in less than 
twenty years. In recent years, C hina’s energy demand actually accelerated. 
From 2000 to 2004, China was responsible for 40 per cent o f the world’s 
total increase in energy consumption.
Coal accounts for about three-quarters o f China’s primary energy con­
sumption. Oil and natural gas account for about one-fifth. Nuclear and re­
newable energies together account for less than 6 per cent and their share 
has not increased in recent years.The recent explosion of private vehicles (an 
increase o f 19 per cent a year) has led to a rapid increase in oil consumption. 
China currently imports 32 per cent o f its oil and the need for imported oil 
is expected to double between now and 2010. By 2020, China’s dependence 
on imported oil could exceed 50 per cent; by 2050 it could exceed 80 per 
cent.20
It might be argued that China uses its energy much more wastefully than 
O EC D  countries, and that there is therefore great potential for China to fuel 
its rapid economic growth by improved energy efficiency rather than rising 
energy consumption. The argument is, however, based on flawed statistics. 
China does appear to have much lower energy efficiency if its GDP is meas­
ured by the market exchange rate. But measured by purchasing power parity, 
which better reflects the material flows o f goods and services, China’s energy 
consumption per dollar o f GDP is higher than the world average by only 
about 10 per cent, and higher than the O EC D  countries by about 20 per 
cent. This suggests that there is only limited scope for China to improve en­
ergy efficiency in the future. Table 1 compares C hina’s energy consumption 
in relation to population, economic output and greenhouse gas emissions 
with selected regions in the world.
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Table 1: Energy Consumption, Population, 
and Economic O utput (2003)*
R egion TPES/
population
TPES /  GDP TPES / 
G D P (PPP)
G O , /  
TPES
China 1.10 0.92 0.23 2.64
O EC D 4.67 0.20 0.19 2.37
Middle East 2.52 0.66 0.38 2.48
Form er U SSR 3.36 2.12 0.51 2.38
N on-O E C D  Europe 1.89 0.76 0.27 2.56
Asia (ex. China) 0.61 0.72 0.19 1.91
Latin America 1.07 0.32 0.16 1.83
Africa 0.66 0.87 0.30 1.36
World 1.69 0.32 0.21 2.36
*TPES stands tor total primary energy supplies measured by tons oi standard 
oil, which equal consumption. C O n stands for carbon dioxide emissions 
measured by tons. PPP stands for purchasing power parity, which estimates 
the long-run equilibrium exchange rates o f different currencies.
Source: International Energy Agency, K ey World Energy Statistics, 2005.
China’s growing demand for energy and especially its thirst for oil must be 
seen in the context o f a developing global energy crisis. The world currently 
depends on oil and gas for 56 per cent, and on all forms o f fossil fuels for 80 
per cent, of its total primary energy consumption. There is growing evidence 
that global oil and gas production could reach a peak and start to decline in 
the coming decade. A growing dependence on coal would accelerate the 
depletion o f coal and greatly worsen the impact on global warming. In the 
foreseeable future it is highly unlikely that the various forms o f renewable 
energy can replace fossil fuels to sustain current levels o f world energy con­
sumption and future economic growth.The current Chinese growth pattern 
could greatly accelerate the global energy crisis and lead to potentially very 
dangerous geopolitical situations.21
China’s per capita emission rate of greenhouse gases is only about one 
tenth of that o f US. But due to its huge population of 1.3 billion people, the 
total emission is considerable. After the USA, China is already the world’s sec­
ond largest greenhouse gases emitter. W ith the current GDP growth trend, it 
is estimated that China may exceed the US as the top emitter in 2020.
Climate models predict that global warming will cause less rainfall in 
northern China and more in southern China.This is consistent with the pat­
tern o f recent years. There has been continuous drought in the N orth  China
Plain since the 1980s, while flooding disasters have happened frequently in 
southern China. This impact has been especially severe since the 1990s. Ac­
cording to a report published in September 2004 by the Chinese and British 
governments, climate change could lead to a drop o f between 20 and 37 per 
cent in China’s yield of rice, wheat and maize over the next 20 to 80 years. 
In short, climate change may greatly exacerbate China’s water crisis and 
threaten its food security.22
6. EN V IRO N M EN TA L INJUSTICE AND EN VIRONM ENTAL 
U N REST: CLASS ISSUES IN  TH E EN V IRO N M EN TA L CRISIS
In recent years there has been growing environmental awareness among Chi­
na’s urban residents. In 1999 the Social Survey Institute o f China surveyed 
households in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Chongqing, Wuhan 
and other cities on the issues that most concern citizens. Environmental pro­
tection was the second highest priority, second only to corruption. Thanks 
in part to increasing public pressure, the capital city Beijing and a handful of 
other big cities are being cleaned up. For example, Beijing has moved nearly 
130 factories out o f the city. Cleaner, gas-fuelled power stations are being 
built while older ones are being retrofitted with scrubbers. Many environ­
mental N G O s in Beijing have been instrumental in this process.23
O ne progressive Chinese scholar, however, commented on this as follows: 
‘It is not clear to me whether these organizations are practicing environmen­
talism or environmental imperialism’. W hile the comment may sound harsh, 
and it is not fair to lay all the blame on environmental NGOs, the criticism 
is not totally unwarranted. Instead of being retrofitted to reduce pollution, 
many polluting factories are simply being relocated to poorer areas. Instead 
o f treating wastewater, many cities are digging long ditches to send the water 
away. While Beijing and Shanghai are increasingly supplied with natural gas 
from western China, many people and factories in the gas-producing areas 
have to purchase coal (sometimes from other areas far away) for their own 
energy needs, because most o f the cleaner fuel is reserved for distant big cit­
ies. As a consequence of these unfair practices, the rural population suffers 
disproportionately from environmental degradation.
Heavy metal pollution serves as an example. Farmers play no part in creat­
ing it; profit-making capitalist industry does. Yet the farmers bear the con­
sequences, often w ithout any form o f compensation. Roughly 20 million 
hectares of farmland is contaminated by heavy metals. Given the average 
size o f a family farm, that translates into about 130 million farmers who are 
negatively impacted. In some o f the worst hot-spots, pollution has become 
a life and death issue. In Shaanxi Province, in a small village o f only 154
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people, there have been 30 deaths due to cancer over the past 27 years.24 In 
Huangmengying, a village o f about 2,400, there have been 114 cancer deaths 
over the past 14 years. The nearby Shaying R iver is so polluted by industrial 
waste that the water is sometimes as black as soy sauce. According to Huo 
Daishan, an independent environmentalist, there are more than 20 cancer 
villages along the river in Shenqiu County alone.25 Along some stretches of 
the Huai River, the death rate is one third higher than and the cancer rate 
twice the provincial average.
While farmers may initially be ignorant of the environmental impact of 
the polluting industries, it is obvious to them that something is wrong when 
the river runs black or when young children die from cancer one after an­
other. Yet local officials are often deaf to the cries and petitions o f the rural 
victims. Their performance is evaluated on the basis o f GDP figures, and 
environmental degradation is not taken into account at all. And local govern­
m ent depends on the taxes and revenues generated by the factories. In some 
cases, the officials themselves are big shareholders in the polluting factories, 
and thus have a direct interest in keeping the factories running and keeping 
costs as low as possible.
W hen the victims have no legitimate means o f addressing their griev­
ances, social unrest is unavoidable. In the eastern province o f Zhejiang there 
have been three big pollution-related protests since April 2005. Each in­
volved thousands or even tens o f thousands o f protesters. In the April 2005 
event in Huaxi village more than 20,000 villagers confronted and drove off 
3,000 police who were sent in to break up a protest against an industrial park. 
In the event of August 2005 protesters set fire to the buildings o f a battery 
manufacturer that was believed to be responsible for lead poisoning in the 
region. It is noteworthy that Zhejiang is a prosperous coastal region and in 
recent years it has enjoyed one o f the highest economic growth rates o f all 
provinces. Yet the local people are increasingly saying ‘n o ’ to this model of 
development.
7. C O N C L U SIO N
The current model o f economic growth in China is not sustainable. If the 
current growth pattern continues, in the not very distant future China may 
have to struggle with a major energy crisis, drastic declines in food produc­
tion, the exhaustion o f usable water resources and an uncontrollable public 
health crisis, as well as catastrophic natural disasters. N ot only could the C hi­
nese economy stop growing, and the existing social structure collapse; the 
potential consequences for the population could be too horrific to imagine.
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O n the other hand, it is very unlikely that either China’s or the world’s 
environmental problems can be effectively addressed within the existing in­
stitutional framework, geared towards economic globalization and hyper­
growth. The pursuit o f profit and accumulation, as well as the operations 
o f the global financial market, are driving China inexorably along a path of 
environmental self-destruction.
To prevent this from happening it is necessary to fundamentally transform 
the entire existing social and economic structure. The economy must be ori­
ented towards meeting the population’s basic needs rather than the pursuit 
o f profit and capital accumulation. To stabilize and improve China’s environ­
mental conditions, China needs first o f all to stabilize its overall consumption 
o f energy, water, and land resources, and then gradually reduce the consump­
tion of these resources to sustainable levels.
This raises the question of how to meet the population’s basic needs at 
relatively low levels o f consumption o f energy and resources. Both historical 
evidence and theoretical arguments indicate that this can not be accom­
plished w ithin a market- fundamentalist system.The only hope lies in a more 
egalitarian economy based on economic democracy, and the recovery and 
cultivation of the commons. In this respect, despite all the problems with 
Maoist China we identified at the beginning of this essay, its successes in 
addressing people’s basic needs with limited material resources are likely to 
be taken by many as providing valuable lessons in the conflicts to come over 
China’s future direction.
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